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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The plaintiffs in this case challenge the constitutionality 
of a public school district's "anti-harassment" policy, 
arguing that it violates the First Amendment's guarantee of 
freedom of speech.1 The District Court, concluding that the 
policy prohibited no more speech than was already 
unlawful under federal and state anti-discrimination laws, 
held that the policy is constitutional and enter ed judgment 
for the school district. We reverse. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiffs also assert that the Policy violates the free speech 
guarantee 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, plaintiffs fail to present any 
authority to show that Pennsylvania's guarantees ar e any broader than 
the First Amendment's. Accordingly, we confine our discussion to the 
plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
In August 1999, the State College Area School District 
("SCASD") adopted an Anti-Harassment Policy ("the Policy"). 
The full text of the Policy is reproduced in the Appendix to 
this opinion; we will briefly review the most relevant 
portions here. 
 
The Policy begins by setting forth its goal--"providing all 
students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school 
environment"--and noting that "[d]isr espect among 
members of the school community is unacceptable behavior 
which threatens to disrupt the school envir onment and well 
being of the individual." The second paragraph contains 
what appears to be the Policy's operative definition of 
harassment: 
 
       Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based 
       on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, 
       national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or 
       other personal characteristics, and which has the 
       purpose or effect of substantially inter fering with a 
       student's educational performance or cr eating an 
       intimidating, hostile or offensive envir onment. 
 
The Policy continues by providing several examples of 
"harassment": 
 
       Harassment can include any unwelcome verbal, written 
       or physical conduct which offends, denigrates or 
       belittles an individual because of any of the 
       characteristics described above. Such conduct 
       includes, but is not limited to, unsolicited der ogatory 
       remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, 
       slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, 
       gestures, physical contact, stalking, thr eatening, 
       bullying, extorting or the display or circulation of 
       written material or pictures. 
 
These examples are followed by a lengthy section 
captioned "Definitions," which defines various types of 
prohibited harassment, including "Sexual harassment," 
"Racial and color harassment," "Harassment on the basis of 
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religion," "Harassment based on national origin," "Disability 
harassment," and "Other harassment" on the basis of 
characteristics such as "clothing, physical appearance, 
social skills, peer group, intellect, educational program, 
hobbies or values, etc." The definitions state that 
harassment "can include unwelcome verbal, written or 
physical conduct directed at" the particular characteristic. 
Examples of specific types of harassment ar e also provided. 
For example, "Racial and color harassment" is said to 
include "nicknames emphasizing stereotypes, racial slurs, 
comments on manner of speaking, and negative r eferences 
to racial customs." Religous harassment r eaches 
"derogatory comments regarding sur names, religious 
tradition, or religious clothing, or religious slurs or graffiti." 
National origins harassment includes "negative comments 
regarding surnames, manner of speaking, customs, 
language, or ethnic slurs." Harassment on the basis of 
sexual orientation extends to "negative name calling and 
degrading behavior." Disability harassment encompasses 
"imitating manner of speech or movement." 
 
The Policy provides that "[a]ny harassment of a student 
by a member of the school community is a violation of this 
policy."2 It establishes pr ocedures for the reporting, 
informal mediation, and formal r esolution of complaints. In 
addition, the Policy sets a list of punishments for 
harassment, "including but not limited to war ning, 
exclusion, suspension, expulsion, transfer, termination, 
discharge . . ., training, education, or counseling." 
 
B. 
 
Plaintiff David Saxe is a member of the Pennsylvania 
State Board of Education and serves as an unpaid 
volunteer for SCASD. He is the legal guardian of both 
student-plaintiffs, who are enrolled in SCASD schools. After 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The school community, by the Policy's ter ms, "includes, but is not 
limited to, all students, school employees, contractors, unpaid 
volunteers, school board members, and other visitors." "School 
employees" include, but are not limited to,"all teachers, support staff, 
administrators, bus drivers, custodians, cafeteria workers, coaches, 
volunteers, and agents of the school." 
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the Anti-Harassment Policy was adopted, Saxe filed suit in 
District Court, alleging that the Policy was facially 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment's fr ee speech 
clause.3 In his Complaint, he alleged that 
 
       [a]ll Plaintiffs openly and sincer ely identify themselves 
       as Christians. They believe, and their religion teaches, 
       that homosexuality is a sin. Plaintiffs further believe 
       that they have a right to speak out about the sinful 
       nature and harmful effects of homosexuality. Plaintiffs 
       also feel compelled by their religion to speak out on 
       other topics, especially moral issues. 
 
(App. 27.) Plaintiffs further alleged that they feared that 
they were likely to be punished under the Policy for 
speaking out about their religious beliefs, engaging in 
symbolic activities reflecting those beliefs, and distributing 
religious literature. (App. 27-28.) They sought to have the 
Policy declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and 
its operation permanently enjoined. 
 
The District Court found that Saxe had standing to 
mount a facial challenge but granted SCASD's motion to 
dismiss on the pleadings, holding that the Policy was 
facially constitutional. See Saxe v. State College Area School 
District, 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 1999). The Court 
found that the Policy's operative definition of harassment 
was contained in its second paragraph, which, as the Court 
read it, prohibited "language or conduct which is based on 
specified characteristics and which has the ef fect of 
`substantially interfering with a student's educational 
performance' or which creates a hostile educational 
atmosphere." Id. at 625. The Court went on to observe that 
this standard is similar to "that used by courts and 
agencies to define harassment for purposes of T itle VII, Title 
IX, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, etc." Id. 
Consequently, the Court held that the Policy does not 
prohibit "anything that is not already prohibited by law" 
and therefore cannot be unconstitutional. Id. at 626. 
Rejecting the plaintiffs' vagueness ar gument, the Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In their complaint, plaintiffs also asserted a claim under the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment, but they do not press this claim 
on appeal. 
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asserted that "a more precise definition of harassment, like 
Justice Stewart's famous description of `por nography,' may 
be virtually impossible." Id. at 625. Plaintiffs appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' free speech 
claims based on its conclusion that "harassment," as 
defined by federal and state anti-discrimination statutes, is 
not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs' characterization of the Policy as a 
"hate speech code," holding instead that it merely prohibits 
harassment that is already unlawful under state and 
federal law. The Court observed: 
 
       Harassment has never been considered to be pr otected 
       activity under the First Amendment. In fact, the 
       harassment prohibited under the Policy alr eady is 
       unlawful. The Policy is a tool which gives SCASD the 
       ability to take action itself against harassment which 
       may subject it to civil liability. 
 
Saxe, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 627. 
 
We disagree with the District Court's r easoning. There is 
no categorical "harassment exception" to the First 
Amendment's free speech clause. Moreover , the SCASD 
Policy prohibits a substantial amount of speech that would 
not constitute actionable harassment under either federal 
or state law. 
 
A. 
 
Because the District Court based its holding on a 
determination that the Policy simply r eplicated existing law, 
we begin by briefly reviewing the scope of the applicable 
anti-harassment statutes. At the federal level, 
discriminatory harassment in the public schools is 
governed primarily by two statutes. Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[n]o person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color , or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any pr ogram or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. 
 
                                6 
  
S 2000d. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
further provides that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
educational program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance." 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a). Although less often 
involved in harassment cases, the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. S 794, makes it unlawful for programs 
receiving federal assistance to discriminate on the basis of 
disability or age.4 
 
The federal courts have held that these statutes cr eate a 
private right of action similar to that available under Title 
VII, which prohibits discrimination in the workplace. Most 
significantly for this case, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a public school student may bring suit 
against a school under Title IX for so-called"hostile 
environment" harassment. Davis v. Monr oe County Board of 
Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992). 
 
The concept of "hostile environment" harassment 
originated in a series of Title VII cases involving sexual 
harassment in the workplace. In Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supr eme Court held that 
Title VII prohibits abusive and discriminatory conduct that 
creates a "hostile environment"--that is, harassment so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court also referred to two state statutes: the 
Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (PHRA) and the Pennsylvania criminal harassment 
statute. We do not believe that either of these statutes is particularly 
relevant to this appeal. The PHRA, 43 P .S.A. SS 951 et seq., prohibits 
discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations on 
the basis of "race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national 
origin or non-job related handicap or disability." 43 P.S.A. S 953. It has 
not been construed, however, to create a cause of action for "hostile 
environment" harassment of a public school student. Pennsylvania's 
criminal harassment statute makes it a criminal of fense when a person, 
with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, subjects or 
threatens to subject that person to unwelcome physical contact; follows 
that person in or about a public place; or behaves in a manner which 
alarms or seriously annoys that person and that serves no legitimate 
purpose. 18 P.S.A. S 2709. Clearly, this law covers a much narrower 
range of conduct than is implicated by the SCASD Policy. 
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severe or pervasive as "to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment and create an abusive working envir onment." 
Id. at 67. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 
(1993), the Court clarified that in order for conduct to 
constitute harassment under a "hostile envir onment" 
theory, it must both: (1) be viewed subjectively as 
harassment by the victim and (2) be objectively severe or 
pervasive enough that a reasonable person would agree 
that it is harassment. See id. at 21-22. The Court 
emphasized that the objective prong of this inquiry must be 
evaluated by looking at the "totality of the cir cumstances." 
"These may include," the Court observed, "the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mer e offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably inter feres with an 
employee's work performance." Id . at 23. See also Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create 
an objectively hostile or abusive work envir onment--an 
environment that a reasonable person wouldfind hostile or 
abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview."). In defining the 
contours of this concept, the Court has repeatedly stated 
that Title VII is not violated by the "mer e utterance of an 
. . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an 
employee" or by mere " `discourtesy or rudeness,' unless so 
severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in 
the conditions of employment." Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). 
 
The Supreme Court has extended an analogous cause of 
action to students under Title IX. Originally, such claims 
were limited to cases involving harassment of a student by 
a teacher or other agent of the school. See Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., supra. However, in 1999, in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, supra, the 
Court held that Title IX also permits a plaintiff to recover 
damages from a federally funded educational institution for 
certain cases of student-on-student sexual harassment. To 
recover in such a case, 
 
       a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of 
       students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
       offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from 
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       the victims' educational experience, that the victim- 
       students are effectively denied equal access to an 
       institution's resources and opportunities. 
 
Id. at 651. This determination " `depends on a constellation 
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships,' including, but not limited to, the ages of the 
harasser and the victim, and the number of individuals 
involved." Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82). The Court 
stressed that "[d]amages are not available for simple acts of 
teasing and name-calling among school childr en, even 
where these comments target differ ences in gender." Id. at 
652. Rather, private damages actions against the school are 
limited to cases is which the school "acts with deliberate 
indifference to known acts of harassment," and those acts 
have "a systemic effect on educational pr ograms and 
activities." Id. at 633, 653.5  
 
B. 
 
With this framework in mind, we now tur n to the District 
Court's assertion that "harassment has never been 
considered to be protected activity under the First 
Amendment." The District Court's categorical 
pronouncement exaggerates the current state of the case 
law in this area. 
 
There is of course no question that non-expr essive, 
physically harassing conduct is entir ely outside the ambit of 
the free speech clause. But there is also no question that 
the free speech clause protects a wide variety of speech that 
listeners may consider deeply offensive, including 
statements that impugn another's race or national origin or 
that denigrate religious beliefs. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940). When laws against harassment attempt to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although both Franklin and Davis  dealt with sexual harassment under 
Title IX, we believe that their reasoning applies equally to harassment on 
the basis of the personal characteristics enumerated in Title VI and 
other relevant federal anti-discrimination statutes. Accord Monteiro v. 
Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F .3d 1022, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(applying Title VI to student-on-student racial harassment). 
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regulate oral or written expression on such topics, however 
detestable the views expressed may be, we cannot turn a 
blind eye to the First Amendment implications. "Where pure 
expression is involved," anti-discrimination law "steers into 
the territory of the First Amendment." DeAngelis v. El Paso 
Mun. Police Officers' Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 
This is especially true because, as the Fifth Cir cuit has 
noted, when anti-discrimination laws are "applied to . . . 
harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults, 
pictorial or literary matter, the statute[s] impose[ ] content- 
based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech." 
DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596-97. Indeed, a disparaging 
comment directed at an individual's sex, race, or some 
other personal characteristic has the potential to create an 
"hostile environment"--and thus come within the ambit of 
anti-discrimination laws--precisely because of its sensitive 
subject matter and because of the odious viewpoint it 
expresses.6 
 
This sort of content- or viewpoint-based restriction is 
ordinarily subject to the most exacting First Amendment 
scrutiny. This point was dramatically illustrated in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), in which the Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Most commentators including those who favor and oppose First 
Amendment protection for harassing speech, agr ee that federal anti- 
discrimination law regulates speech on the basis of content and 
viewpoint. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve 
Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment 
Harassing Speech, 84 Geo. L.J. 399, 433 (1996); Eugene Volokh, How 
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 563, 571-72 
(1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Pr ohibitions Against Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in 
Sight, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 461, 477 (1995); Richard H. Fallon, Sexual 
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That 
Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1994); Kingsley R. Browne, Title 
VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First 
Amendment, 52 Ohio State L.J. 481, 481 (1991); Marcy Strauss, Sexist 
Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (1990). But 
see Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the First Amendment: Content- 
Neutral Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the "Reasonable Person", 58 
Ohio St. L.J. 1217 (1997). 
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Court struck down a municipal hate-speech or dinance 
prohibiting "fighting words" that ar oused "anger, alarm or 
resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender." Id. at 377. While r ecognizing that fighting words 
generally are unprotected by the First Amendment, the 
Court nevertheless found that the ordinance 
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of content 
and viewpoint: 
 
       Displays containing some words--odious racial 
       epithets, for example--would be prohibited to 
       proponents of all views. But "fighting wor ds" that do 
       not themselves invoke race, color, cr eed, religion, or 
       gender--aspersions upon a person's mother, for 
       example--would seemingly be usable ad libitum  in the 
       placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. 
       tolerance and equality, but could not be used by that 
       speaker's opponents. 
 
Id. at 391. Striking down the law, the Court concluded that 
"[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority 
preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than 
silencing speech on the basis of content." Id . at 392. 
 
Loosely worded anti-harassment laws may pose some of 
the same problems as the St. Paul hate speech ordinance: 
they may regulate deeply offensive and potentially 
disruptive categories of speech based, at least in part, on 
subject matter and viewpoint. Although the Supr eme Court 
has written extensively on the scope of workplace 
harassment, it has never squarely addressed whether 
harassment, when it takes the form of pur e speech, is 
exempt from First Amendment protection. See Weller v. 
Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 n.6 (5th Cir. 
1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has "pr ovid[ed] little 
guidance whether conduct targeted for its expr essive 
content . . . may be regulated under Title VII"); Aguilar v. 
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 863 (Cal. 1999) 
(Werdegar, J., concurring) ("No decision by the United 
States Supreme Court has, as yet, declar ed that the First 
Amendment permits restrictions on speech creating a 
hostile work environment.").7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), which SCASD cites for 
the proposition that Title VII's pr ohibitions do not offend the First 
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SCASD relies heavily on a passage in R.A.V . in which the 
Court suggested in dictum that at least some harassing 
speech does not warrant First Amendment protection: 
 
       [S]ince words in some circumstances violate laws 
       directed not against speech but against conduct (a law 
       against treason, for example, is violated by telling the 
       enemy the nation's defense secrets) a particular 
       content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of 
       speech can be swept up incidentally within the r each of 
       a statute directed at conduct rather than speech [citing 
       Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991); 
       FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 
       411, 425-432 (1990); and United States v. O'Brien, 391 
       U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968)]. Thus, for example, sexually 
       derogatory "fighting words," among other words, may 
       produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition 
       against sexual discrimination in employment practices. 
       Where the government does not tar get conduct on the 
       basis of its expressive content, acts ar e not shielded 
       from regulation merely because they express a 
       discriminatory idea or philosophy. 
 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (other citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 
This passage suggests that government may 
constitutionally prohibit speech whose non-expressive 
qualities promote discrimination. For example, a 
supervisor's statement "sleep with me or you'r e fired" may 
be proscribed not on the ground of any expressive idea that 
the statement communicates, but rather because it 
facilitates the threat of discriminatory conduct. Despite the 
purely verbal quality of such a threat, it surely is no more 
"speech" for First Amendment purposes than the robber's 
demand "your money or your life." Accor d NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617, 618 (1969) (holding that 
employer's "threat of retaliation" on basis of union 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Amendment, is inapposite. Hishon, which was decided years before the 
Supreme Court even recognized the existence of a "hostile environment" 
cause of action under that statute, only addr essed the constitutionality 
of the statute's application to quid pro quo harassment. 
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membership was "without the protection of the First 
Amendment") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).8 Similarly, we see no constitutional problem with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The cases cited in R.A.V. each upheld a restriction on expressive 
conduct that was based solely on secondary ef fects of the speech that 
were merely incidental to its expr essive content. In none of these cases, 
however, did the Court imply that the gover nment may prohibit speech 
based on a desire to suppress the ideas it communicates. In Barnes, the 
Court found that the state's legitimate inter est in preventing public 
nudity permitted it to enforce a public indecency statute against a nude 
dancing establishment: 
 
       [W]e do not think that when Indiana applies its statute to the nude 
       dancing in these nightclubs it is proscribing nudity because of the 
       erotic message conveyed by the dancers. . . . The perceived evil 
that 
       Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity. 
       The appearance of people of all shapes, sizes and ages in the nude 
       at a beach, for example, would convey little if any erotic message, 
       yet the State still seeks to prevent it. Public nudity is the evil 
the 
       State seeks to prevent, whether or not it is combined with 
expressive 
       activity. 
 
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570. Similarly, in Supreme Court Trial Lawyers, the 
Court upheld, against First Amendment challenge, the application of the 
Sherman Act against boycotters based on the boycott's economic effects: 
 
       A nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive 
       effect on local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the 
       strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic 
       regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental 
       effect on rights of speech and association. 
 
Supreme Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 428 n.12 (quoting NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)). Finally, in O'Brien, 
the Court found no First Amendment impediment to pr osecuting anti- 
war protestors who had violated federal law by burning their draft cards: 
 
       [E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in 
       O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First 
       Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a 
       registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. . 
. . The 
       many functions performed by Selective Service certificates 
establish 
       beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substantial 
       interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction 
       and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who 
       knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them. 
 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 380. Accor d Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 
467, 487-88 (1993) (noting that conduct not tar geted on the basis of its 
expressive content may be regulated under Title VII). 
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using an employer's offensive speech as evidence of motive 
or intent in a case involving an allegedly discriminatory 
employment action. Accord Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 
159 (1992) ("The Constitution does not er ect a per se 
barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's 
beliefs and associations . . . simply because those beliefs 
and associations are protected by the First Amendment."). 
 
The previously quoted passage from R.A.V., however, does 
not necessarily mean that anti-discrimination laws are 
categorically immune from First Amendment challenge 
when they are applied to prohibit speech solely on the basis 
of its expressive content. See DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596 n.7; 
John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 
S 16.39, at 1116 (5th ed. 1995). "Harassing" or 
discriminatory speech, although evil and offensive, may be 
used to communicate ideas or emotions that nevertheless 
implicate First Amendment protections. As the Supreme 
Court has emphatically declared, "[i]f there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expr ession of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea offensive or 
disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 
For this reason, we cannot accept SCASD's contention 
that the application of anti-harassment law to expr essive 
speech can be justified as a regulation of the speech's 
"secondary effects." R.A.V.  did acknowledge that content- 
discriminatory speech restrictions may be per missible when 
the content classification merely "happens to be associated 
with particular `secondary effects' of the speech, so that the 
regulation is `justified without r eference to the content of 
the . . . speech.' " R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). The 
Supreme Court has made it clear, however , that the 
government may not prohibit speech under a "secondary 
effects" rationale based solely on the emotive impact that its 
offensive content may have on a listener:"Listeners' 
reactions to speech are not the type of`secondary effects' 
we referred to in Renton. . . . The emotive impact of speech 
on its audience is not a `secondary effect.' " Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see also United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1885 (2000) ("The 
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overriding justification for the regulation is concern for the 
effect of the subject matter on [listeners] . . . . This is the 
essence of content-based regulation."); Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) ("Listeners' 
reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for 
regulation."). Nor do we believe that the r estriction of 
expressive speech on the basis of its content may be 
characterized as a mere "time, place and manner" 
regulation. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) 
("time, place and manner" analysis not applicable when 
statute "regulates speech on the basis of its content"); 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 
20 (1986) ("[f]or a time, place, or manner r egulation to be 
valid, it must be neutral as to the content of the speech"); 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
530, 536 (1980) ("a constitutionally permissible time, place, 
or manner restriction may not be based upon either the 
content or subject matter of speech"). 
 
In short, we see little basis for the District Court's 
sweeping assertion that "harassment"--at least when it 
consists of speech targeted solely on the basis of its 
expressive content--"has never been considered to be 
protected activity under the First Amendment." Such a 
categorical rule is without precedent in the decisions of the 
Supreme Court or this Court, and it belies the very real 
tension between anti-harassment laws and the 
Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech. 
 
We do not suggest, of course, that no application of anti- 
harassment law to expressive speech can survive First 
Amendment scrutiny. Certainly, preventing discrimination 
in the workplace--and in the schools--is not only a 
legitimate, but a compelling, government inter est. See, e.g., 
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987). And, as some courts and 
commentators have suggested, speech may be mor e readily 
subject to restrictions when a school or workplace audience 
is "captive" and cannot avoid the objectionable speech. See, 
e.g., Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 871-73 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
We simply note that we have found no categorical rule that 
divests "harassing" speech, as defined by federal anti- 
discrimination statutes, of First Amendment pr otection. 
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C. 
 
In any event, we need not map the precise boundary 
between permissible anti-discrimination legislation and 
impermissible restrictions on First Amendment rights 
today. Assuming for present purposes that the federal anti- 
discrimination laws are constitutional in all of their 
applications to pure speech, we note that the SCASD 
Policy's reach is considerably broader . 
 
For one thing, the Policy prohibits harassment based on 
personal characteristics that are not pr otected under 
federal law. Titles VI and IX, taken together with the other 
relevant federal statutes, cover only harassment based on 
sex, race, color, national origin, age and disability. The 
Policy, in contrast, is much broader, r eaching, at the 
extreme, a catch-all category of "other personal 
characteristics" (which, the Policy states, includes things 
like "clothing," "appearance," "hobbies and values," and 
"social skills"). Insofar as the policy attempts to prevent 
students from making negative comments about each 
others' "appearance," "clothing," and"social skills," it may 
be brave, futile, or merely silly. But attempting to proscribe 
negative comments about "values," as that ter m is 
commonly used today, is something else altogether . By 
prohibiting disparaging speech directed at a person's 
"values," the Policy strikes at the heart of moral and 
political discourse--the lifeblood of constitutional self 
government (and democratic education) and the core 
concern of the First Amendment. That speech about 
"values" may offend is not cause for its prohibition, but 
rather the reason for its protection:"a principal `function of 
free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.' " 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (quoting 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). No court or 
legislature has ever suggested that unwelcome speech 
directed at another's "values" may be pr ohibited under the 
rubric of anti-discrimination. 
 
We do not suggest, of course, that a public school may 
never adopt regulations more protective than existing law; 
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it may, provided that those regulations do not offend the 
Constitution. Such regulations cannot be insulated from 
First Amendment challenge, however, based on the 
argument that they do no more than pr ohibit conduct that 
is already unlawful. 
 
Moreover, the Policy's prohibition extends beyond 
harassment that objectively denies a student equal access 
to a school's education resources. Even on a narrow 
reading, the Policy unequivocally prohibits any verbal or 
physical conduct that is based on an enumerated personal 
characteristic and that "has the purpose or effect of 
substantially interfering with a student's educational 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
environment." (emphasis added). Unlike federal anti- 
harassment law, which imposes liability only when 
harassment has "a systemic effect on educational programs 
and activities," Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added), 
the Policy extends to speech that merely has the "purpose" 
of harassing another. This formulation, by focusing on the 
speaker's motive rather than the effect of speech on the 
learning environment, appears to sweep in those "simple 
acts of teasing and name-calling" that the Davis Court 
explicitly held were insufficient for liability. 
 
D. 
 
The District Court justifies its ruling by a syllogism: (1) 
the SCASD Policy covers only speech that is alr eady 
prohibited under federal and state anti-harassment laws; 
(2) such prohibited speech is not entitled to First 
Amendment protection; (3) therefor e, the Policy poses no 
First Amendment problems. This reasoning is flawed in 
both its major and minor premises. First, the Policy--even 
narrowly interpreted--covers substantially more speech 
than applicable federal and state laws. Second, the courts 
have never embraced a categorical "harassment exception" 
from First Amendment protection for speech that is within 
the ambit of federal anti-discrimination laws. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, we must examine whether the Policy may be 
justified as a permissible regulation of speech within the 
schools. 
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A. 
 
We begin by reviewing the Supreme Court's cases 
demarcating the scope of a student's right to freedom of 
expression while in school.9 The Court set out the 
framework for student free speech claims in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 
503 (1969). In Tinker, a group of students was suspended 
for wearing black armbands to protest American 
involvement in the Vietnam War . The Court held that the 
wearing of the armbands to make a political statement was 
"closely akin to `pure speech' " and thus was 
constitutionally protected. Id. at 505. Taking as its premise 
that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to fr eedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," id. at 506, 
the Court reasoned that 
 
       [t]he school officials banned and sought to punish 
       petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, 
       unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the 
       part of the petitioners. There is here no evidence 
       whatever of the petitioners' interference, actual or 
       nascent, with the school's work or of collision with the 
       rights of other students to be secure and left alone. 
       Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or 
       action that intrudes upon the work of the school or the 
       rights of other students. 
 
Id. at 504. Significantly, the Court emphasized that 
"undifferentiated fear or appr ehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. 
at 508. 
 
Under Tinker, then, regulation of student speech is 
generally permissible only when the speech would 
substantially disrupt or interfere with the work of the 
school or the rights of other students. As subsequent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We recognize that the SCASD Policy restricts the speech, not only of 
students, but also of teachers, volunteers and other adult members of 
the "school community." Because we conclude, however, that the Policy 
fails under the less stringent standards for the restriction of student 
speech, we need not address this matter further . 
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federal cases have made clear, Tinker requires a specific 
and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote 
apprehension of disturbance. In Chandler v. McMinnville 
School District, 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir . 1992), for example, 
a middle school punished students who wore"SCAB" 
buttons to protest replacement teachers during a strike. 
Because the school had failed to present any evidence that 
the buttons were "inherently disruptive" to school activities, 
the court held that students could proceed with their First 
Amendment claim. In Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent 
School District, 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. T ex. 1997), a high 
school student challenged his school's policy against gang- 
related apparel. The school applied the ban to prohibit the 
plaintiff, a devout Catholic, from wearing a rosary to school 
on the ground that some gangs had adopted the r osary as 
their identifying symbol. The court held that the ban failed 
to satisfy Tinker's substantial disruption test: 
 
       [A]lthough Plaintiffs wore their r osaries outside their 
       shirts for several months, they were never misidentified 
       as gang members nor approached by gang members. 
       There also was no evidence that they attracted the 
       attention of other students because of their r osaries. 
       . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that ther e was 
       insufficient evidence of actual disruption at New Caney 
       High School, or that there was substantial r eason for 
       NCISD to anticipate a disruption, to justify the 
       infringement on Plaintiffs' religiously-motivated speech. 
 
Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 667. Finally, in Clark v. Dallas 
Independent School District, 806 F. Supp. 116, 120 (N.D. 
Tex. 1992), the court held that a high school could not 
prohibit its students from distributing r eligious tracts on 
school grounds. Again citing Tinker , the court held that 
"Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiffs' 
distribution of the religious tracts gave rise to a material or 
substantial disruption of the operation" of the school. Id. at 
120. Noting that the only evidence of disruption was the 
objection of several other students, the court observed that 
"[i]f school officials were per mitted to prohibit expression to 
which other students objected, absent any further 
justification, the officials would have a license to prohibit 
virtually every type of expression." Id . 
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The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in West v. Derby 
Unified School District No. 260, 206 F .3d 1358 (10th Cir. 
2000), which reached a different r esult, nevertheless 
confirms Tinker's requir ements of specificity and 
concreteness. In West, a middle school student was 
suspended for drawing a Confederate flag in math class 
under a school policy providing that a "student shall not 
racially harass or intimidate another student by name 
calling, using racial or derogatory slurs,[or] wearing or 
possession of items depicting or implying racial hatred or 
prejudice." Id. at 1361. The Court upheld the suspension 
under Tinker's substantial disruption standard, finding 
that the school had demonstrated a concrete thr eat of 
substantial disruption: 
 
       [B]ased upon recent past events, Derby School District 
       officials had reason to believe that a student's display 
       of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and 
       interfere with the rights of other students to be secure 
       and let alone. . . . The district experienced a series of 
       racial incidents [including "hostile confr ontations" and 
       at least one fight] in 1995, some of which wer e related 
       to the Confederate flag. . . . The Racial Harassment 
       policy enacted in response to this situation was clearly 
       something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
       discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
       an unpopular viewpoint. The history of racial tension 
       in the district made administrators' and par ents' 
       concerns about future substantial disruptions from 
       possession of Confederate flag symbols at school 
       reasonable. 
 
Id. at 1366 (citation omitted). As W est makes clear, the 
mere desire to avoid "discomfort" or"unpleasantness" is not 
enough to justify restricting student speech under Tinker. 
However, if a school can point to a well-founded expectation 
of disruption--especially one based on past incidents 
arising out of similar speech--the restriction may pass 
constitutional muster. 
 
Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out a 
number of narrow categories of speech that a school may 
restrict even without the threat of substantial disruption. In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
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(1986), the Court upheld the school's suspension of a high 
school student who, at a school assembly, nominated a 
peer for class office through "an elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor." Id. at 677. Holding that the 
student's expression was not protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court reasoned that 
 
       [t]he schools, as instruments of the state, may 
       determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature 
       conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates 
       lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such 
       as that indulged in by this confused boy. 
 
Id. at 683. Distinguishing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971), in which the Court struck down an adult's 
conviction for wearing a jacket bearing an obscenity in a 
public courthouse, the Court explained that 
 
       [i]t does not follow . . . that, simply because the use of 
       an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited 
       to adults making what the speaker considers a political 
       point, the same latitude must be permitted to children 
       in public school. . . . "[T]he First Amendment gives a 
       high school student the classroom right to wear 
       Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket." 
 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (citations omitted). According to 
Fraser, then, there is no First Amendment protection for 
"lewd," "vulgar," "indecent," and "plainly offensive" speech 
in school. Fraser permits a school to prohibit words that 
"offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends"--a 
dichotomy neatly illustrated by the comparison between 
Cohen's jacket and Tinker's armband. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
685 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 
(1978)); see also Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 286 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Fraser 
exception limited "to the appropriateness of the manner in 
which the message is conveyed, not of the message's 
content"); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. 
of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1193 (D. 
Utah 1999) ("Fraser speaks to the for m and manner of 
student speech, not its substance. It addresses the mode of 
expression, not its content or viewpoint."). 
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Finally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 258 (1988), the Court upheld, against First 
Amendment challenge, a principal's deletion of student 
articles on teen pregnancy from a school-sponsored 
newspaper. Distinguishing Tinker , the Court noted the 
school had not opened the newspaper up as a public forum 
and therefore could "exercis[e] editorial control over the 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities as long as [its] actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concer ns." Id. at 273 
(emphasis added). As the Court reasoned, 
 
       [t]he question whether the First Amendment r equires a 
       school to tolerate particular student speech--the 
       question that we addressed in Tinker --is different from 
       the question whether the First Amendment requir es a 
       school affirmatively to promote particular student 
       speech. The former question addresses educators' 
       ability to silence a student's personal expr ession that 
       happens to occur on the school premises. The latter 
       question concerns educators' authority over school- 
       sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and 
       other expressive activities that students, par ents, and 
       members of the public might reasonably per ceive to 
       bear the imprimatur of the school. . . . Educators are 
       entitled to exercise greater contr ol over this second 
       form of student expression . . . . 
 
Id. at 270-71. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court made 
clear that Hazelwood's permissive"legitimate pedagogical 
concern" test governs only when a student's school- 
sponsored speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of 
the school itself: 
 
       [W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content- 
       based choices. When the University determines the 
       content of the education it provides, it is the University 
       speaking, and we have permitted the gover nment to 
       regulate the content of what is or is not expr essed 
       when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities 
       to convey its own message. . . . It does not follow, 
       however . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are 
       proper when the University does not itself speak or 
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       subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 
       encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers. 
       A holding that the University may not discriminate 
       based on the viewpoint of private persons whose 
       speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's 
       own speech, which is controlled by differ ent principles. 
       See, e.g., . . . Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, [484 
       U.S. at 270-72]. 
 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. Similarly, a post-Hazelwood 
case from the Seventh Circuit illustrates that school 
"sponsorship" of student speech is not lightly to be 
presumed. See Hedges v. Wauconda Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. 
No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir . 1993). In striking 
down a blanket prohibition against distributing religious 
materials on school grounds, the Hedges Court rejected the 
argument that the ban was justified under Hazelwood 
because observers might "infer that the school endorses 
whatever it permits": 
 
       [The School District] proposes to thr ow up its hands, 
       declaring that because misconceptions are possible it 
       may silence its pupils, that the best defense against 
       misunderstanding is censorship. . . . Public belief that 
       the government is partial does not per mit the 
       government to become partial. Students ther efore may 
       hand out literature even if the recipients would 
       misunderstand its provenance. The school's pr oper 
       response is to educate the audience rather than 
       squelch the speaker. 
 
Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299; see also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 
1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) ("under ground newspaper" 
distributed on school grounds could not r easonably be 
viewed as school-sponsored). 
 
To summarize: Under Fraser, a school may categorically 
prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language. Under 
Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech 
(that is, speech that a reasonable observer would view as 
the school's own speech) on the basis of any legitimate 
pedagogical concern. Speech falling outside of these 
categories is subject to Tinker's general rule: it may be 
regulated only if it would substantially disrupt school 
 
                                23 
  
operations or interfere with the right of others. See 
Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529; Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. 
Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass. 1994). 
 
IV. 
 
We turn now to the SCASD Policy itself. Saxe levies facial 
challenges against the Policy on both overbr eadth and 
vagueness grounds. Because we hold that the Policy, even 
narrowly read, is unconstitutionally overbroad, we do not 
reach the merits of Saxe's vagueness claim. 
 
A. 
 
A regulation is unconstitutional on its face on 
overbreadth grounds where ther e is a "a likelihood that the 
statute's very existence will inhibit free expr ession" by 
"inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before 
the Court." Members of City Council v. T axpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984). T o render a law 
unconstitutional, the overbreadth must be "not only real 
but substantial in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
 
On first reading, the Policy on its face appears both 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. As an initial 
matter, the Policy contains several separate passages, each 
of which could be read as embodying its operative definition 
of banned speech. The Policy's second paragraph sets forth 
one definition: 
 
       Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based 
       on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, 
       national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or 
       other personal characteristics, and which has the 
       purpose or effect of substantially inter fering with a 
       student's educational performance or cr eating an 
       intimidating, hostile or offensive envir onment. 
 
This, however, is immediately followed two paragraphs 
later by a statement that harassment under the Policy "can 
include any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct 
which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because 
of any of the characteristics described above." In addition, 
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in a separate section, the Policy purports to set out 
"definitions" for various categories of harassment that do 
not always coincide with the above-quoted language. 
Religious harassment, for example, is defined as 
"unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct directed at 
the characteristics of a person's religion, such as 
derogatory comments regarding sur names, religious 
tradition, or religious clothing, or religious slurs, or graffiti." 
 
Certainly, some of these purported definitions of 
harassment are facially overbroad. No one would suggest 
that a school could constitutionally ban "any unwelcome 
verbal . . . conduct which offends . . . an individual because 
of " some enumerated personal characteristics. Nor could 
the school constitutionally restrict, without more, any 
"unwelcome verbal . . . conduct directed at the 
characteristics of a person's religion." The Supreme Court 
has held time and again, both within and outside of the 
school context, that the mere fact that someone might take 
offense at the content of speech is not sufficient 
justification for prohibiting it. See T inker, 393 U.S. at 509 
(school may not prohibit speech based on the"mere desire 
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint");  T exas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gover nment 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly 
settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas ar e themselves 
offensive to some of their hearers."); see also Doe v. 
University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 
1989) (striking down university speech code: "Nor could the 
University proscribe speech simply because it was found to 
be offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people."). 
 
Before declaring the Policy unconstitutional, however, we 
must first determine whether it is susceptible to a 
reasonable limiting construction: "the elementary rule is 
that every reasonable construction must be r esorted to, in 
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality."10 Stretton 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Saxe's citation to Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 
425 U.S. 610 (1976), ostensibly for the proposition that federal courts 
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v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see 
also Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hof fman Estates, 455 U.S. 
489, 494 n.4 (1982) ("In evaluating a facial challenge to a 
state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any 
limiting construction."); Broadrick , 413 U.S.at 617 n.16 ("a 
federal court must determine what a state statute means 
before it can judge its facial unconstitutionality"). 
 
When the Policy is read as a whole, it appears that its 
operative definition of prohibited harassment is contained 
in the above-quoted second paragraph, which r equires that 
speech either "substantially interfer[e] with a student's 
educational performance or creat[e] an intimidating, hostile 
or offensive environment." The Policy's fourth paragraph 
and "Definitions" section could reasonably be read as 
merely listing examples of conduct that might (but would 
not necessarily) violate this operative definition. On this 
narrow reading, the second paragraph would supply the 
Policy's "formal" definition of pr ohibited harassment, but 
the other sections of the Policy could still be r elevant in 
clarifying vague or ambiguous terms in that operative 
definition. 
 
So narrowed, the Policy would requir e the following 
elements before speech could be deemed harassing: (1) 
verbal or physical conduct (2) that is based on one's actual 
or perceived personal characteristics and (3) that has the 
purpose or effect of either (3a) substantially interfering with 
a student's educational performance or (3b) creating an 
intimidating hostile, or offensive envir onment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
may not give a narrowing construction to a local statute, is inapposite. 
In Hynes, the New Jersey Supreme Court had already authoritatively 
construed the scope of the challenged statute. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the state court's narrowing construction failed to solve the 
law's vagueness problems and that, in light of the existing authoritative 
interpretation, the federal courts were without power to further limit the 
statute. See 425 U.S. at 622. Here, in contrast, the SCASD Policy has 
not been authoritatively construed by the state courts, and we are 
therefore required to give it a reasonable narrowing construction if 
necessary to save it from unconstitutionality. 
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It is apparent from these elements that SCASD cannot 
take solace in the relatively more per missive Fraser or 
Hazelwood standards. First, the Policy does not confine 
itself merely to vulgar or lewd speech; rather , it reaches any 
speech that interferes or is intended to interfere with 
educational performance or that cr eates or is intended to 
create a hostile environment. While some Fraser-type 
speech may fall within this definition, the Policy's scope is 
clearly broader. Second, the Policy does not contain any 
geographical or contextual limitations; rather , it purports to 
cover "[a]ny harassment of a student by a member of the 
school community." Thus, its strictures pr esumably apply 
whether the harassment occurs in a school sponsor ed 
assembly, in the classroom, in the hall between classes, or 
in a playground or athletic facility.11 Obviously, the Policy 
covers far more than just Hazelwood-type school-sponsored 
speech; it also sweeps in private student speech that merely 
"happens to occur on the school premises." Hazelwood, 484 
U.S. at 271. As a result, SCASD cannot r ely on 
Hazelwood's more lenient "legitimate pedagogical concern" 
test in defending the Policy from facial attack. 
 
In short, the Policy, even narrowly read, prohibits a 
substantial amount of non-vulgar, non-sponsor ed student 
speech. SCASD must therefore satisfy the Tinker test by 
showing that the Policy's restrictions ar e necessary to 
prevent substantial disruption or inter ference with the work 
of the school or the rights of other students. Applying this 
test, we conclude that the Policy is substantially overbroad. 
 
As an initial matter, the Policy punishes not only speech 
that actually causes disruption, but also speech that 
merely intends to do so: by its terms, it covers speech 
"which has the purpose or effect of " interfering with 
educational performance or creating a hostile environment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Indeed, Saxe even suggests that the Policy could even be read to 
cover conduct occurring outside of school pr emises. This reading is not 
implausible based on the Policy's plain language, and would raise 
additional constitutional questions. See, e.g. , Boucher v. School Board 
of 
the School District of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) 
("school officials' authority over off-campus expression is much more 
limited than it is over expression on school gr ounds"); Klein v. Smith, 
635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986) (student's vulgarity directed at teacher 
off school premises was "too attenuated to support discipline"). 
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This ignores Tinker's requir ement that a school must 
reasonably believe that speech will cause actual, material 
disruption before prohibiting it. 
 
In addition, even if the "purpose" component is ignored, 
we do not believe that prohibited "harassment," as defined 
by the Policy, necessarily rises to the level of a substantial 
disruption under Tinker. We agr ee that the Policy's first 
prong, which prohibits speech that would"substantially 
interfer[e] with a student's educational performance," may 
satisfy the Tinker standard. The primary function of a 
public school is to educate its students; conduct that 
substantially interferes with the mission is, almost by 
definition, disruptive to the school envir onment. 
 
The Policy's second criterion, however--which pr ohibits 
speech that "creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
environment"--poses a more difficult problem. There are 
several possible grounds on which SCASD could attempt to 
justify this prohibition. First, SCASD could ar gue that it 
has an interest in avoiding liability for harassment under 
Franklin and Davis. However, because the Policy prohibits 
substantially more conduct than would give rise to liability 
under these cases, this justification is unavailing. 
 
Second, SCASD could argue that speech cr eating a 
"hostile environment" may be banned because it "intrudes 
upon . . . the rights of other students." T inker, 393 U.S. at 
504. The precise scope of Tinker's  "interference with the 
rights of others" language is unclear; at least one court has 
opined that it covers only independently tortious speech 
like libel, slander or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. See Slotterback v. Interbor o Sch. Dist., 766 F. 
Supp. 280, 289 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see also Kuhlmeier v. 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir.), rev'd 
on other grounds, 484 U.S. 260 (1986). In any case, it is 
certainly not enough that the speech is merely offensive to 
some listener. See, e.g., Rivera , 721 F. Supp. at 1191. 
Because the Policy's "hostile environment" prong does not, 
on its face, require any threshold showing of severity or 
pervasiveness, it could conceivably be applied to cover any 
speech about some enumerated personal characteristics the 
content of which offends someone.12  This could include 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Such a reading would be consistent with the Policy's very broad 
statement of purpose, which notes that "[m]embers of the school 
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much "core" political and religious speech: the Policy's 
"Definitions" section lists as examples of covered 
harassment "negative" or "derogatory" speech about such 
contentious issues as "racial customs," "r eligious tradition," 
"language," "sexual orientation," and"values." Such speech, 
when it does not pose a realistic threat of substantial 
disruption, is within a student's First Amendment rights. 
 
Finally, SCASD might argue that the "hostile 
environment" prohibition is requir ed to maintain an orderly 
and non-disruptive educational environment. However, as 
Tinker made clear, the "undif ferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance" is not enough to justify a 
restriction on student speech. Although SCASD correctly 
asserts that it has a compelling interest in pr omoting an 
educational environment that is safe and conducive to 
learning, it fails to provide any particularized reason as to 
why it anticipates substantial disruption fr om the broad 
swath of student speech prohibited under the Policy. 
 
The Policy, then, appears to cover substantially mor e 
speech than could be prohibited under T inker's substantial 
disruption test. Accordingly, we hold that the Policy is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is reversed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
community are expected to treat each other with mutual respect" and 
that "[d]isrespect among members of the school community is 
unacceptable behavior." 
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APPENDIX 
 
STATE COLLEGE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
State College PA 16801 
 
ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICY 
(approved August 9, 1999) 
 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY 
 
The State College Area School District is committed to 
providing all students with a safe, secur e, and nurturing 
school environment. Members of the school community are 
expected to treat each other with mutual r espect. 
Disrespect among members of the school community is 
unacceptable behavior which threatens to disrupt the 
school environment and well being of the individual. 
 
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on 
one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, national 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other 
personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or 
effect of substantially interfering with a student's 
educational performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive environment. 
 
According to state law (18 Pa. C.S.A. ~2709), an individual 
commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to 
harass, annoy or alarm another person, the individual 
subjects, or attempts or threatens to subject, the other 
person to unwelcome physical contact; follows the other 
person in or about a public place or places; or behaves in 
a manner which alarms or seriously annoys the other 
person and which serves no legitimate purpose. 
 
Harassment can include any unwelcome verbal, written or 
physical conduct which offends, denigrates, or belittles an 
individual because of any of the characteristics described 
above. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to 
unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning 
comments or behavior, slurs, mimicking, name calling, 
graffiti, innuendo, gestures, physical contact, stalking, 
threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or circulation 
of written materials or pictures. 
 
It is the policy of the State College Area School District to 
oppose and prohibit, without qualification harassment 
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based on race, color, religion, national origin, gender, 
sexual orientation, disability, and other for ms of 
harassment. Harassment is not only a form of 
discrimination, but also disrespectful behavior which will 
not be tolerated. 
 
Any harassment of a student by a member of the school 
community is a violation of this policy. 
 
The State College Area School District shall act to 
investigate all complaints of harassment, either for mal or 
informal, verbal or written, and will take appropriate action 
against any member of the school community who is found 
to have violated this policy. 
 
It is a separate and distinct violation of this policy for any 
member of the school community to retaliate against any 
person who reports alleged harassment or against any 
person who testifies, assists or participates in an 
investigation, proceeding or hearing relating to such 
harassment. It is possible that an alleged harasser may be 
found to have violated this anti-retaliation pr ovision even if 
the underlying complaint of harassment is not found to be 
a violation of this policy. Retaliation includes, but is not 
limited to any form of intimidation, r eprisal or harassment 
and may be redressed through application of the same 
reporting, investigation, and enforcement procedures as for 
harassment. In addition, a person who knowingly makes a 
false report may be subject to the same action that the 
State College Area School District may take against any 
other individual who violates this policy. The ter m "false 
report" refers only to those made in bad faith and does not 
include a complaint that could not be corroborated or 
which did not rise to the level of harassment. 
 
Any school employee or student who is found to have 
violated this policy shall be subject to action including, but 
not limited to warning, remedial training, education or 
counseling, suspension, exclusion, expulsion, transfer, 
termination or discharge, and legal action under state and 
federal statutes. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
School community includes, but is not limited to, all 
students, school employees, contractors, unpaid volunteers, 
school board members, and other visitors. 
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School employee includes, but is not limited to, all 
teachers, support staff, administrators, bus drivers, 
custodians, cafeteria workers, coaches, volunteers, and 
agents of the school. 
 
Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature when: 
 
       (a) submission to that conduct is made either explicitly 
       or implicitly a term or condition of a student's 
       education; 
 
       (b) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a 
       student is used as a component of the basis for 
       decisions affecting that student; 
 
       (c) the conduct has the purpose or effect of 
       substantially interfering with a student's educational 
       performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
       offensive educational environment. 
 
This applies whether the harassment is between people of 
the same or different gender. Sexual harassment can 
include unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct, 
directed at or related to a person's gender, such as sexual 
gossip or personal comments of a sexual natur e, sexually 
suggestive or foul language, sexual jokes, whistling, 
spreading rumors or lies of a sexual natur e about someone, 
demanding sexual favors, forcing sexual activity by threat 
of punishment or offer of educational r eward, obscene 
graffiti, display or sending of pornographic pictures or 
objects, offensive touching, pinching, grabbing, kissing or 
hugging or restraining someone's movement in a sexual 
way. 
 
Racial and color harassment can include unwelcome 
verbal, written, or physical conduct directed at the 
characteristics of a person's race or color, such as 
nicknames emphasizing stereotypes, racial slurs, comments 
on manner of speaking, and negative refer ence to racial 
customs. 
 
Harassment on the basis of religion is unwelcome verbal, 
written or physical conduct directed at the characteristics 
of a person's religion, such as derogatory comments 
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regarding surnames, religious tradition, or religious 
clothing, or religious slurs, or graffiti. 
 
Harassment on the basis of national origin is unwelcome 
verbal, written or physical conduct directed at the 
characteristics of a person's national origin, such as 
negative comments regarding surnames, manner of 
speaking, customs, language, or ethnic slurs. 
 
Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation  is 
unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct dir ected at 
the characteristics of a person's perceived sexual 
orientation, such as negative name calling and degrading 
behavior. 
 
Disability harassment includes harassment based on a 
person's disabling mental or physical condition and 
includes any unwelcome verbal, written or physical 
conduct, directed at the characteristics of a person's 
disabling condition, such as imitating manner of speech or 
movement, or interference with necessary equipment. 
 
Other harassment on the basis of such things as clothing, 
physical appearance, social skills, peer group, income, 
intellect, educational program, hobbies or values, etc. may 
also cause or effect substantial inter fering with a student's 
educational performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive environment. This type of harassment is 
also protected against by this policy and pr ocedures. 
 
PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI- 
HARASSMENT POLICY 
 
Reporting 
 
Any school employee who observes, overhears or otherwise 
witnesses harassment, which may be unlawful, or to whom 
such harassment is reported, must take pr ompt and 
appropriate action to stop the harassment and to prevent 
its recurrence. 
 
In the event that the school employee is unable to 
personally take prompt and appropriate action, the 
employee must report the incident or complaint in writing, 
ordinarily within one school day, to the appr opriate school 
complaint official(s) designated by this policy. 
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Any student or other person who believes that harassment 
of a student has occurred shall inform any school employee 
or one of the harassment complaint officials. 
 
Any student who believes that he/she has been the target 
of harassment as defined in this policy may bring his/her 
complaint to the attention of any school employee or the 
harassment complaint official(s). The complaint may be 
made either orally or in writing. The following ar e the 
harassment complaint officials: 
 
       Principal in each building or his/her designee 
 
       or 
 
       Personnel Director 
 
If one of the harassment complaint officials is the person 
alleged to be engaged in the harassment, the complaint 
shall be filed with one of the alternative officials or any 
other school employee the student chooses. 
 
Process 
 
Informal Procedure 
 
It may be possible to resolve a complaint thr ough a 
voluntary conversation between the complaining student 
and the alleged harasser which is facilitated by a school 
employee or by a designated harassment complaint official. 
The State College Area School District believes that this 
Informal Procedure may be an opportunity for educating 
students regarding what may not be understood to be 
offensive. In addition, those trained in mediation may 
provide an avenue to resolve issues of harassment in a 
problem-solving model. If the complaining student or 
alleged harasser is a student under the age of 18, the 
harassment complaint official should notify the student's 
parent(s)/guardian(s) if, after initial consultation with the 
student, it is determined to be in the best interests of the 
student. Both the complaining student and the alleged 
harasser may be accompanied by a person of his/her 
choice for support and guidance. If the complaining student 
and the alleged harasser feel that a resolution has been 
achieved, then the conversation may remain confidential 
and no further action is necessary. The results of an 
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informal resolution shall be reported by the facilitator, in 
writing, to the superintendent and to the school principal. 
 
If the complaining student, the alleged harasser , or the 
school employee/harassment complaint official, chooses not 
to utilize the informal procedure, or believes that the 
informal procedure has been unsuccessful, he/she may 
proceed to the formal procedur e. Any complaint against a 
school employee shall be handled through the formal 
procedure. 
 
Formal Procedure 
 
Step 1 
 
The harassment complaint official shall fill out a 
harassment complaint form based on the written or verbal 
allegations of the complaining student. This complaint form 
shall be kept in a centralized and secure location. 
 
       (a) The complaint form shall detail the facts and 
       circumstances of the incident or patter n of behavior. 
 
       (b) If a student under 18 years of age is involved, 
       his/her parents shall be notified immediately unless, 
       after consultation with the student, it is deter mined 
       not to be in the best interests of the student. 
 
       (c) An investigation shall be completed by the 
       harassment complaint official within 14 calendar days 
       from the date of the complaint or report. 
 
Step 2 
 
The investigation may consist of personal interviews with 
the complaining student, the alleged harasser and any 
other individuals who may have knowledge of the alleged 
incident(s) or circumstances giving rise to the complaint. In 
determining whether alleged conduct constitutes a violation 
of this policy, the harassment complaint official should 
consider the surrounding circumstances, any relevant 
documents, the nature of the behavior, past incidents or 
past or continuing patterns of behavior , the relationships 
between the parties involved and the context in which the 
alleged incidents occurred. Whether a particular action or 
incident constitutes a violation of this policy r equires a 
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determination based on all the facts and surr ounding 
circumstances. 
 
In addition, the State College Area School District may take 
immediate steps, at its discretion, to pr otect the 
complaining student, alleged harasser, witnesses, and 
school employees pending completion of an investigation of 
alleged harassment and may make any appropriate 
referrals for assistance, including but not limited to 
counseling, rape crisis intervention, notification of police, 
etc. 
 
The investigation will be completed as soon as practicable, 
but no later than 10 school days from the complaint or 
report. The harassment complaint official shall make a 
written report to the superintendent and the school 
principal upon completion of the investigation. The report 
shall include a determination as to whether the allegations 
have been substantiated as factual and whether they 
appear to be violations of this policy. 
 
Step 3 
 
Following the investigation, the harassment complaint 
official shall recommend to the superintendent and/or 
school principal what action, if any, is requir ed. The State 
College Area School District shall take appr opriate action in 
all cases where the harassment complaint official concludes 
that this policy has been violated. Any person who is 
determined to have violated this policy shall be subject to 
action, including but not limited to warning, exclusion, 
suspension, expulsion, transfer, termination, discharge or 
any other remedial action, including but not limited to 
training, education, or counseling. Action taken for 
violation of this policy shall be consistent with the 
requirements of any applicable collective bargaining 
agreement, State College Area School District policy, state 
and federal law, including but not limited to the due 
process protections for students with disabilities. 
 
Step 4 
 
The Director of Personnel or school principal shall maintain 
the written report of the investigation and r esults in 
his/her office. In the case of an investigation conducted by 
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the school district, the superintendent shall r eceive a copy 
of the investigation report and results. If the harassment 
complaint official concludes that the policy has been 
violated by a professional educator or administrator, a 
report of the findings shall be filed in the district employee's 
personnel file. 
 
The complaining student and the alleged harasser shall be 
informed of the results of the investigation, including 
whether the allegations were found to be factual, whether 
there was a violation of the policy, and whether disciplinary 
action was or will be taken. 
 
REPORTING OF POTENTIAL PHYSICAL AND/OR 
SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
Several behaviors listed as sexual harassment (i.e., sexual 
touching, grabbing, pinching, being forced to kiss someone, 
being forced to do something sexual other than kissing, 
sexual assault) may also constitute physical or sexual 
abuse. Physical abuse is defined as inflicting intentional 
bodily harm. Sexual abuse is defined as any act or acts by 
a person involving sexual molestation or exploitation of 
another person, including but not limited to incest, 
prostitution, rape, sodomy or any lewd or lascivious 
conduct. Thus, under certain circumstances, alleged 
harassment may also be possible physical and/or sexual 
abuse under Pennsylvania law. Such harassment or abuse 
is subject to the duties of mandatory reporting and must be 
reported to the appropriate authorities within 24 hours of 
the time the educator becomes aware of the suspected 
abuse. (Reference State College Area School District Policy 
#806) 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The State College Area School District r ecognizes that both 
the complaining student and the alleged harasser have 
strong interests in maintaining the confidentiality of the 
allegations and related information. The privacy of the 
complaining student, the individual(s) against whom the 
complaint is filed, and the witnesses will be r espected as 
much as possible, consistent with legal obligations to 
investigate, to take appropriate action, and to comply with 
any discovery or disclosure obligations. 
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ALTERNATIVE COMPLAINT PROCEDURES 
 
In addition to, or instead of, filing a harassment complaint 
through this policy, a person may choose to exercise other 
options, including but not limited to filing a complaint with 
outside agencies including the police or filing a private 
lawsuit. 
 
Outside Agencies 
 
A charge of harassment may also be investigated by the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education, or the Office for 
Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education which 
may be contacted as follows: 
 
       PA Human Relations Commission 
       Harrisburg Regional Office 
       1101-1125 South Front Street 
       Harrisburg, PA 17104 
       Phone: (717)787-9784 
       TTY: (717) 787-7279 
 
       Pennsylvania Department of Education 
       333 Market Street 
       Harrisburg, PA 17126-0333 
       Phone: (717) 787-2644 
       TTY: (717) 783-8445 
 
       Office for Civil Rights, Philadelphia Office 
       U.S. Department of Education 
       3535 Market Street, Room 6300, 03-2010 
       Philadelphia, PA 19104-3326 
       Phone: (215) 596-6787 
       TTY: (215) 596-6794 
 
LITIGATION 
 
A student who has been harassed may file a lawsuit under 
a number of federal or state statutes (including T itles IV, 
VI, and IX of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and appropriate Pennsylvania 
laws). He or she or his/her parent(s) should consult with a 
private attorney about these rights and options. 
 
NOTICE AND PUBLICATION 
 
The State College Area Board of School Dir ectors shall 
provide notice of the policy and procedur es to students, 
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custodial parents or guardians and school employees. 
Notice to students shall be in age-appropriate language and 
should include examples of harassment. At a minimum, the 
policy shall be conspicuously posted throughout each 
school building in areas accessible to all members of the 
school community. The notice shall also appear in the 
school handbook and any other publication of the school 
district that sets forth the comprehensive rules, procedures 
and standards of conduct for the school. Ther e shall be 
procedures for publicizing, on an annual basis, the identity 
of the harassment complaint officials who ar e designated to 
receive complaints. The board shall use its discretion in 
developing and initiating age-appropriate pr ograms to 
effectively inform students and school employees about the 
substance of the policy and procedures in order to help 
prevent harassment. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I write separately only to note my strong disagreement 
with the notion, espoused by the District Court and 
discussed at length in Part II.B of the majority opinion, that 
the judicial analysis of permissible r estrictions on speech in 
a given setting should be affected -- let alone dictated -- by 
legislative enactments intended to proscribe activity that 
could be classified as "harassment." Our attempt at 
reasoning through this postulate should demonstrate its 
futility, given the numerous variables that impact on any 
determination regarding the limits of permissible speech 
and the rigorous analysis that we must follow in every First 
Amendment case -- the analysis that our opinion does in 
fact follow in reaching the result in this case. 
 
Perhaps the only way, or time, that such legislation could 
be a guide would be if its provisions wer e identical to the 
policy at issue, or if in a case involving an as-applied 
challenge to a policy, the legislative provisions addressed 
every aspect of the particular factual setting at issue. Even 
then, I submit that it would be the reasoning by a court 
upholding its constitutionality, rather than the legislation 
itself, that would provide the necessary guidance. 
 
I view the use of harassment legislation as an especially 
inappropriate barometer here because this case is not a 
harassment case. Rather, it is framed by appellants as a 
First Amendment speech case. Moreover, it is a school 
speech case. While reliance on provisions of harassment 
laws or policies might be an easy way to resolve difficult 
cases such as this one, therein lies the rub-- there are no 
easy ways in the complex area of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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